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British policy towards military cooperation with the Republic of South 
Africa, 1961-75 
Abstract 
The early 1960s were a turbulent time in South Africa; the Sharpeville Massacre 
provoked condemnation from the international community, which, with the 
acceleration of decolonisation, was turning increasingly against Pretoria. The 
decision to withdraw its re-application to the Commonwealth in October 1960 further 
isolated South Africa. Despite this, UK-South African military cooperation remained 
largely unaffected until the pivotal Simonstown Agreement’s termination in 1975. 
This article explores this relationship and explains why British policymakers 
consistently maintained links with an overtly racist regime. UK-South African military 
cooperation was persistently controversial and engendered frequent criticism from 
African members of the Commonwealth and from campaigning groups such as the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement, whose membership included Labour ministers. 
Concurrently, Pretoria was viewed as an important Cold War ally, particularly in the 
context of the build-up of Soviet naval incursions into the Indian Ocean from 1968 
onwards. This article will analyse how British officials attempted to navigate its 
military relations with South Africa under such heated circumstances. 
Key Words: UK-South African, Simonstown Agreement, Apartheid, Arms Embargo  
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Introduction  
On 13 March 1965, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced his government’s 
intention to adhere to the UN voluntary arms embargo against South Africa. Later 
that month, Vice Admiral Sir Fitzroy Talbot, Britain’s naval representative in Pretoria, 
reportedly stated that he saw no change in the relationship between the Royal Navy 
(RN) and South African Navy (SAN). This sentiment was reinforced by his 
replacement Vice Admiral John Gray, who stated that ‘all forms of weapons use 
training as well as the fullest co-operation with the South African Navy, would 
continue during his command’.1  
At first glance, it appears strange that these naval personnel talked positively of 
military cooperation with Pretoria at a time when the British government (HMG) was 
moving to isolate the country in this area. Five years earlier, the Conservative Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan had stood before the South African parliament and 
proclaimed that a ‘wind of change’ was blowing through the continent. Framed in a 
Cold War context, Macmillan argued that ‘Whether we like it or not, [the] growth of 
[African] national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. 
Our national policies must take account of it.’2 However, despite decolonisation, the 
rise of independent black African states, and the arms embargo, close relations were 
maintained between the British and South African militaries as a point of national 
policy. Joint exercises continued and South African servicemen took part in specialist 
training courses in the UK. In fact, the RN made one of its most controversial visits to 
South Africa in 1967, despite Pretoria’s warning that all crew members would be 
subject to race-based apartheid laws while on shore leave. This article aims to 
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examine HMG’s motivations in maintaining this relationship in the face of fierce 
criticism, both domestically and from large sections of the UN and Commonwealth.  
The 1960s were a particularly turbulent time for the UK both domestically and 
overseas. Unsure of Britain’s role in the post-imperial age, policymakers tried to 
maintain world power status by retaining a global military presence ‘east of Suez’. 
This was, however, increasingly difficult, as the economy stagnated and the balance 
of payments deficit reached £800 million. This coincided with the United States 
playing an ever increasing role in the Vietnam War over the 1960s, particularly under 
the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. HMG’s refusal to commit troops to the conflict 
put a strain on UK-US relations.3 US involvement in the Vietnam War also made 
Britain’s presence ‘east of Suez’ all the more important to the Western Alliance as 
US resources were focused on Indochina. Secretary of State Dean Rusk even 
contended that ‘the UK can perform security functions that no other nation can take 
over’ owing to its experience in these countries during the colonial period.4    
The international context, and stability of the Western Alliance, was also challenged 
by France’s decision to withdraw from NATO’s integrated command in 1966, 
meaning French troops would no longer be available for use by NATO.5 There were 
also fragmentations in unity in the East as the Sino-Soviet split, which started with 
Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin in 1956, led to a border conflict between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet Union (USSR) by 1969. While this may 
have appeared to be beneficial for Western interests, it meant, particularly in the 
‘undecided world’, that there were more external actors attempting to incorporate 
newly independent nations into their spheres of influence.6 All these broader issues 
must be taken into account when analysing British policy towards Pretoria, and 
Africa more generally, in the years 1960-1975. 
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There has been some limited scholarship devoted to UK-South African military 
relations in the period being examined. Most recently, Allan Du Toit, a retired senior 
officer in both the SAN and Royal Australian Navy, has published extensively on this 
topic.7 While Du Toit’s work offers a useful overview of UK-SA naval relations, its 
broadness in covering a period ranging from 1898 to 1975 means that it lacks any 
real detail. Only a few pages are devoted to the period analysed in this article, which 
offers a far more in-depth account of HMG policy towards UK-SA military relations. 
Tim Bale has examined the debates within HMG about the possible modification of 
the arms embargo against South Africa in 1967 to allow for the sale of defensive 
maritime equipment.8 While Bale does offer some discussion of foreign policy 
priorities, this article is more concerned with the inner working of the Labour cabinet 
in this period and the personal rivalries and ideological disagreements that came out 
through heated debates, press leaks, and deals with backbench MPs. John Young 
has examined the debates over the Labour Party’s decision to implement the 
voluntary arms embargo against South Africa in 1964, with particular reference to the 
Wilson government’s decision to allow the sale of Blackburn Buccaneer maritime 
strike aircraft to the republic.9  This article will use a similar framework to Young’s, 
however applied over a longer period and incorporating a comparative analysis of 
the policies of Labour and Conservative governments in the years 1961 - 1975.  
This article offers a historical background to UK-SA military contact up to the latter’s 
decision to leave the Commonwealth in 1961, before focussing on three key themes 
to analyse the motivations behind Britain's continued military cooperation with the 
republic. The first theme examines the role played by economic and commercial 
factors in motivating continued contact. As Britain was South Africa's main arms 
supplier when Pretoria left the Commonwealth in 1961, there was clearly an 
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economic motivation linked to maintaining relations and continuing such sales. 
However, economic considerations were more complex than this. Geoffrey Berridge 
argues that they played a major part in UK-SA relations in the period in question, 
owing to Britain's reliance on certain strategic minerals found in abundance in the 
republic.10 There was also considerable private investment in South Africa by British 
businesses and individuals; this meant that HMG officials had to be careful in how 
they handled their dealings with their South African counterparts for fear of putting 
the UK economy in jeopardy.  
Crucial to this analysis is an assessment of how UK-SA military relations correlated 
with Britain’s broader strategic interests at the time. These included the Simonstown 
Naval base’s position in-between the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean which made 
South Africa strategically important to the British presence 'east of Suez'. Even once 
the decolonisation process was completed, and east of Suez withdrawal announced, 
the base was still viewed as important in the context of Soviet naval expansion into 
the Indian Ocean from 1968, showing that the Cold War significantly influenced 
relations. Only months before South Africa's decision to leave the Commonwealth, 
the Congo Crises brought East-West tensions to sub-Saharan Africa. In January 
1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev vowed to support all wars of ‘national 
liberation', quickly making good on this by offering support to the nationalist 
movements of Lusophone Africa.11 Thus, from the mid-1960s the Cold War in Africa 
moved from the northern and central parts of the continent to its southern regions. In 
addition to this, rebel groups in the Portuguese colonies took a more Marxist line and 
were critical of the first wave of post-colonial leaders for failing to break the shackles 
of dependence on Europe and the West.12 Despite the existence of a right-wing 
authoritarian regime in Lisbon, Britain offered tacit support to Portugal, fearing the 
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spread of communism throughout southern Africa. The same considerations applied 
to South Africa as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and African National 
Congress (ANC) worked closely together. Several individuals, most prominently Joe 
Slovo, played a key role in both organisations and the formation of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe, the ANC’s armed wing.13 South Africa became increasingly involved in 
southern Africa’s Cold War conflicts after the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 
brought about Portugal’s rapid decolonisation. Pretoria, in co-ordination with the USA 
and Rhodesia, looked to support ‘moderate’ groups fighting against Marxist 
governments in Angola and Mozambique. Policymakers, particularly in the military, 
believed they faced a ‘communist onslaught’ from their neighbours and, as a Marxist 
leaning government looked more likely in Rhodesia, became convinced that the 
future of ‘white civilisation’ in the region was under threat.14 
The final section examines how UK-SA cooperation affected British interests 
elsewhere. HMG had to consider how collaboration with Pretoria impacted their 
relations with other African states and potentially jeopardised Commonwealth unity. 
During the 1960s, Western nations increasingly realised that, by maintaining close 
relations with the racialist regimes in southern Africa, they risked pushing other 
African and Asian states closer to the USSR or PRC. These Commonwealth 
considerations will also be discussed in the context of the Rhodesian Crisis that 
emerged after Salisbury’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the UK 
in 1965. This had a bearing on UK-SA military cooperation; while Pretoria was 
Salisbury’s closest ally in this period, HMG officials believed that the republic could 
play an important role in ending the crises by persuading Rhodesian Prime Minister 
Ian Smith to come to the negotiating table. This affected Britain’s military relations 
with South Africa as officials were careful not to alienate Pretoria at key points in the 
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negotiating process by avoiding the cancellation of joint exercises with the SAN, or 
by refusing South African service personnel places on British training courses. At the 
same time, the Commonwealth placed increasing pressure on HMG to ‘solve’ the 
Rhodesian problem. This emphasises the balancing act policymakers had to play 
when orchestrating relations with both the white minority regimes and Afro-Asian 
members of the Commonwealth and UN.  
Historic Ties  
It was historical British colonial occupation in southern Africa that was the anvil upon 
which post-1945 ties between London and Pretoria were forged. South Africa was a 
British ally in both world wars, and naval cooperation was a key theme in the 
alliance. The UK had first established a presence at Simonstown, just south of Cape 
Town, in 1806. The harbour was significantly expanded and new dockyards 
completed in 1910, just as the Union of South Africa was formed.15 Even though the 
Union was meant to be autonomous, the RN maintained control of the Simonstown 
base in the absence of a professional South African navy.16 Even as preparations 
were made in the 1920s for South Africa to take control of its defence policy, the 
Smuts-Churchill Agreement of 1921 allowed the UK to maintain control over the 
Simonstown base. This situation remained, even after South Africa’s de facto 
independence was formerly ratified with the Statute of Westminster in 1931.17 While 
the Union Defence Force (UDF) took complete control of South Africa’s land 
defences, Pretoria remained reliant on the RN for maritime protection.  
Despite the creation of the Union’s own land defence force in 1912, in practical terms 
the UDF was still indirectly bound to British military values, standards, conventions, 
and traditions for decades to come.18 The UDF wore similar uniforms, used a similar 
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ranking system, and followed comparable procedure to their British counterparts. 
The UDF also relied on the secondment of British army officers to fulfil its officer 
training needs.19 This allowed Britain to maintain informal influence over the UDF 
and would, in the eyes of British policymakers, ensure standards remained high, thus 
benefiting British interests should South Africa offer support at a time of war. British 
officers also played a prominent role in the establishment of South Africa’s first 
military training institution in Bloemfontein in 1912, where the South African Military 
School and its successor, the South African Military College, continued to adhere to 
British military traditions.20 The first three commandants of these institutions were all 
former British colonial officers and the college modelled itself on Sandhurst.21 
Training was mostly conducted in English and based on manuals supplied by the 
British army.22 South African officers also regularly undertook training on specialist 
courses at various British training facilities.23  
Lingering resentment ensured that few Afrikaners joined the UDF’s ranks, viewing it 
as too British in character. Involvement in WWII solidified this because of the 
secondment of British officers to command South African troops. Pretoria’s decision 
to enter WWII fuelled Afrikaner disdain for the service as many wanted South Africa 
to remain neutral. For large numbers of Afrikaners, this involvement emphasised the 
UDF’s pro-British nature.24 After 1948, with the introduction of apartheid, the National 
Party (NP) government began making moves to strengthen Afrikaner cultural and 
symbolic nationalism within the country. In addition to this, the NP began to cut ties 
with the former colonial power. Afrikaner Defence Minister Frans Erasmus 
epitomised this policy in his handling of the country’s armed forces from 1948-59. 
Erasmus systematically purged the UDF’s upper echelons of Anglophone South 
Africans, as well as any Afrikaners who supported former Prime Minister Jan Smuts 
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and the United Party. 25 Erasmus also attempted to re-brand the armed forces with 
changes to uniforms, medals and the introduction of an Afrikaner ranking system.26 
He also drastically curtailed contact with the UK, with the number of South African 
servicemen attending courses at British army training institutions falling from 121 in 
1948-49 to seventeen in 1952.27 
The NP’s electoral success also threatened British control over the Simonstown 
base. The party wished to purge the last vestiges of British imperialism from the 
country and the RN presence was a stark reminder of Britain’s former dominance. 
Many Afrikaner nationalists wanted to see South African forces take full control of the 
base. Despite these difficulties, UK-SA military cooperation survived the rise of 
Afrikaner nationalism. The 1955 Simonstown Agreement (hereafter ‘the Agreement’) 
saw control of Simonstown handed to Pretoria.28 There has been extensive 
historiographical debate over who was the main beneficiary of the Agreement. The 
orthodox interpretation argues that the UK profited most from the Agreement as the 
RN and its allies were permitted to use the base at all times even during a war in 
which South Africa remained neutral.29 In addition to this, the Agreement forced a 
modification of apartheid laws at the base; workers and sailors of non-European 
descent would be exempt from the racist segregation enforced throughout the 
country. The UK also maintained overflying rights for the whole territory of South 
Africa, while a senior RN officer remained stationed at Simonstown as Commander 
in Chief South Atlantic and South America (CICSASA), overseeing the British and 
South African forces there. 
However, Geoffrey Berridge and Jack Spence claim that South Africa was the main 
benefactor from the Agreement.30 Control over the base was returned to the Union  
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and HMG was unable to achieve one of its primary objectives in the negotiations; 
persuading South Africa to commit to the defence of the Middle East, which was 
seen as a key Cold War battle ground and important bulwark to stop the spread of 
communism into Africa. More recently, Peter Henshaw has reasserted the orthodox 
interpretation arguing that Berridge and Spence’s work is ‘rather theoretical’ and 
relegated the significance of the UK maintaining ‘unqualified availability’ of the base’s 
facilities.31 Henshaw also contends that the Agreement’s commercial aspect, which 
saw the SAN invest in a full modernisation programme, allowed the UK to secure ‘a 
leading role in the development of that navy’.32  
It is clear that whilst compromises were made by both sides, several aspects of the 
agreement were mutually beneficial; for example, guarantees of regular training for 
South African officers in the UK offered the Union access to specialist courses while 
allowing the UK to maintain influence over certain sections of the country’s armed 
forces. Joint exercises between the two navies also continued. This was naturally 
beneficial to South Africa as it provided support to the defence of its waters, whilst 
for the UK it offered a partner in the defence of an important sea route. The 
relationship between the two countries’ armed forces also benefited from Erasmus’ 
move from Defence Secretary to Justice Minister in a Cabinet re-shuffle in 1959. His 
successor, Jacobus Johannes Fouché, took a more pragmatic approach to military 
cooperation with the UK.33 Shortly after the re-shuffle, the SAN reverted to its original 
RN-influenced uniform.34  
South Africa’s stance on racial segregation increasingly became an outlier in the late 
1950s and early 1960s as the European powers were forced to dismantle their 
empires in Asia and Africa. In February 1960 Macmillan delivered his ‘Wind of 
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Change’ speech warning South Africa to take heed of these new circumstances. 
However, this clearly fell on deaf ears. In the following month, Apartheid policies and 
the South African state brutality were subject to international condemnation after 
white police officers killed sixty-nine unarmed demonstrators in the town of 
Sharpeville. UK-SA relations became increasing tense and in October 1960, South 
Africa’s white electorate voted to become a republic, meaning they had to re-apply 
for Commonwealth membership as the Queen would no longer be the head of 
state.35 In theory, this should not have been a problem as India had retained its 
membership after it became a republic in 1950. However, South Africa faced hostility 
from African and Asian Commonwealth members because of its racist policies, 
ultimately leading to President Hendrik Verwoerd’s decision to withdraw South 
Africa’s re-application.   
Despite this, the vote did little to alter UK-SA military cooperation. On 28 June 1961, 
Harold Watkinson, Britain’s Minister of Defence, met with Fouché to discuss the 
future of UK-SA military cooperation. It was agreed that joint exercises between the 
two country’s navies would ‘continue as at present’.36 Watkinson advised Fouché 
that it was increasingly difficult for the UK to sell small arms ammunition to South 
Africa, as this could be used for internal repression, potentially leading to 
international condemnation, though, notably, if other suppliers were not forthcoming, 
Watkinson stated that the UK would be willing to reconsider its decision. Both sides 
desired the continuation of South African soldiers training in the UK ‘particularly 
because of the high proportion of equipment of the South African forces which was 
of United Kingdom origin.’37 
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Economic Considerations  
Economic considerations are a consistent theme in HMG’s approach to selling arms 
to the republic. In advance of the talks to re-negotiate the Agreement in January 
1967 a document was prepared by the Foreign Office (FO) and Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) which set out Britain’s objectives. One of the key aims was to secure a large 
purchase order of naval equipment in light of the re-negotiation. 38 A 1970 Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) report discussing the implications of resuming 
arms sales to Pretoria stated explicitly that Britain’s ‘main political interest in South 
Africa is to maintain relations at a level of friendliness which will allow our economic 
interests to prosper’.39 Geoffrey Berridge argues that HMG’s policy towards South 
Africa in this period was influenced largely by Britain’s reliance on the supply of key 
strategic minerals, notably uranium and gold, meaning that Pretoria had a 
‘formidable economic grip on Britain.’40 More recent literature has largely dismissed 
Berridge’s thesis.41 James Barber and John Barratt state that ‘there is no direct 
evidence of Pretoria using economic pressure in its dealings with Western states,’ 
although they do admit that ‘in their diplomatic and political relations both sides were 
conscious of the mutual benefits they derived from economic links.’42 While South 
Africa may not have been the more powerful partner in the relationship, as Berridge 
has argued, this section demonstrates how its economic importance to the UK was a 
motivating factor in maintaining cordial links with the republic in the military sphere.  
Despite leaving the Commonwealth in 1961, and increasingly isolated as a result of 
Apartheid, Pretoria continued to receive arms from Britain for ‘external use’.43 This 
correlates with Britain’s overall foreign policy in the 1960s, which Saki Dockrill 
argues was focused on maintaining ‘order in the world for the sake of its commercial 
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and financial wealth.’44 It should also be noted that, during the 1960s, Britain’s trade 
with South Africa was more than with the whole of Commonwealth Africa 
combined.45 Despite the economic importance of South Africa to the UK, Wilson’s 
first Labour government implemented an arms embargo in 1965, as the Party could 
not ‘stand by as an inactive observer of this tragic situation.’46 However, it should be 
noted that the supply of spare parts and ammunition for weapons previously 
purchased from Britain would continue and the Labour government agreed to honour 
the order for a squadron of Blackburn Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft that had 
been ordered under the previous administration.47 Philip Alexander argues that 
economic considerations were a key factor in this decision, citing Commons 
Secretary Herbert Bowden’s warning that ‘Britain could ill afford to indulge in 
economic warfare with South Africa.’48 Pretoria’s requests were also generally dealt 
with in a sympathetic manner and British officials interpreted the UN resolutions ‘as 
favourably as possible to South Africa’.49  
On 4 July 1966 the sale of Beagle aircraft to South Africa was licensed by the 
Strategic Export Committee against the FO’s advice. Investigative journalist Paul 
Foot argues that the Beagle 206 ‘would almost certainly have been used for military 
or internal security purposes’ as they had been ‘specially reconstructed for military 
use and twenty of them had already been bought by the RAF.’50 Foreign Secretary 
Michael Stewart urged the license to be revoked, fearing the potential impact it would 
have on UK-US relations, as the engines used in these aircraft were manufactured in 
the US.51 President Johnson had recently tightened the US interpretation of the arms 
embargo to include a number of so called ‘gray area’ items that, like the Beagle 206, 
had ‘the potential for dual civilian/military use’.52 Board of Trade (BoT) President 
Douglas Jay responded to Stewart’s protest by writing directly to Wilson, pleading for 
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the sale to go ahead. Jay warned of wider repercussions in UK-SA trade if they were 
cancelled and pointed to Pretoria’s decision to cancel all future orders from the 
American Ford company ‘military or otherwise’ after the US government refused to 
allow the sale of ‘chassis cabs’ for the South African Ministry of Defence in 
December 1964.53 Jay pointedly argued that ‘the USA can afford this sort of 
treatment. We cannot.’54 Ultimately, however, Washington intervened and vetoed the 
sale, something which certain sections of the British press, most notably the Daily 
Mail, argued was to open up the market for US manufactured Cessnas rather than 
any moral commitment to the arms embargo.55   
While Berridge may have overemphasised Pretoria’s power over British policy, it is 
clear that HMG was restricted in how far it could push certain issues because of its 
economic vulnerability. Indeed, principle was often downplayed in Britain’s post-war 
foreign economic policies, owing to the country’s precarious financial 
circumstances.In addition to this, although certain sections of the Labour party were 
fiercely opposed to relations with South Africa, many in the frontbenches took a more 
pragmatic position. In practice, this meant that the party’s ascension to power did not 
precipitate a hiatus in relations between London and Pretoria which many, 
particularly in South Africa, had expected.56  
When the Agreement was renegotiated in January 1967, in light of the 1966 Defence 
Review, it was decided that the SAN would take full responsibility for Simonstown’s 
day-to-day running. Melvyn Brown, Assistant Head of the West and Central Africa 
Department, FCO, stated that the key purpose of these talks was to ensure that 
Britain’s naval withdrawal was undertaken in a way that would not jeopardise its 
‘vitally important relations with South Africa in other areas, for e.g. trade’.57  Pretoria 
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accepted this situation and a ‘greater responsibility for the Cape Route at a time of 
war.’58 However, they attempted to capitalise on this new role and Britain’s economic 
difficulties at the time by approaching HMG with an extensive arms ‘shopping list’.59 
The MoD and FCO were aware that South Africa was planning an extensive order of 
new equipment and one of their aims in the re-negotiation was not to jeopardise this 
potential sale.60 Ambassador Nicholls used the prospect of ‘orders running into tens 
of millions of pounds’ as justification for the Agreement’s continuation even if ‘little 
strategic importance’ was attached to the facilities it offered.61  
Information about the potential sale and HMG’s consideration of restarting arms 
sales to South Africa was subsequently leaked to the press: this was one of the most 
controversial incidents in Wilson’s time in office.62 Several ministers, most notably 
Foreign Secretary George Brown and Defence Secretary Denis Healey, contended 
that the sale should go ahead due to Britain’s precarious economic position. There 
were also concerns that a refusal may affect other forms of trade with South Africa. 
Hargreaves argues that, at this time, owing to the constant attacks HMG faced over 
its handling of Rhodesia ‘Healey, Brown and other leading ministers no longer 
shared the euphoria of Labour idealists about African nationalism and the multi-racial 
Commonwealth’ and contends that some of their advisors ‘even regretted the 
departure of South Africa’ from the Commonwealth.63 There was often a gulf 
between the attitudes of grassroots party activists and the parliamentary Labour 
party on such issues, and, as left-wing Labour grandee Tony Benn argued some 
years later, the ‘moral position on foreign policy’ Labour advocates while in 
opposition is often ‘completely eroded’ when the party enters government.64 Labour 
policy on the arms trade was often morally ambiguous, frequently viewed as a key 
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means of maintaining an important role in world affairs and a ‘gateway to the 
continued exercise of political influence.’65  
Wilson feared that the issue had the potential to split the Labour Party and used his 
contacts with backbenchers to plant a parliamentary question, leading to a debate in 
the House of Commons in which he categorically denied that sales of arms to South 
Africa would recommence.66 Bale argues that this was a pivotal moment in Wilson’s 
first administration and it allowed him to re-assert his authority as Prime Minister and 
seriously weaken opposition from those on the right within his cabinet.67  
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1970, the sale of weapons for maritime 
defence was renewed. This was justified due to the perceived Soviet Naval threat in 
the Indian Ocean. Policymakers emphasised the importance of the Simonstown 
base in countering this potential Soviet aggression in addition to the need to work 
with South Africa as a potential Cold War ally and partner in the South Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans’ defence.68  There was also an economic benefit to this renewal of 
sales as it meant a potential income of between £50 million and £100 million over a 
five-year period.69 A report on the potential impact of a resumption of arms sales on 
British relations with ‘Black Africa’ produced by the MoD and FCO in September 
1970 claimed that lifting the embargo was likely to improve other areas of trade with 
South Africa.70 However, the report concluded that South Africa was unlikely to allow 
relations with the UK to deteriorate even without the resumption of arms sales as it 
was ‘of major economic and political importance to her’.71 
It is clear that economic considerations were a motivating factor in maintaining UK-
SA military relations. The importance of these considerations is emphasised in 
policymakers placing the potential sale of military hardware as one of three key 
18 
 
objectives prior to entering negotiations regarding the Agreement’s future in January 
1967.72 However, economic considerations alone do not offer valid justification for 
the continuation of military cooperation, particularly in the face of ‘black’ African 
opposition, which policymakers believed was much more likely to have economic 
repercussions on Britain than maintaining the arms embargo and further ostracising 
South Africa militarily.73 Even when the Conservative administration partially lifted 
the embargo in 1970, it only allowed the sale of maritime weapons and justified this 
as a strategic consideration in the context of the Cold War.  
Strategic Interests 
In the early 1960s, with the decolonisation process underway, maintaining a military 
presence ‘east of Suez’ to safeguard British interests in the Persian Gulf and Far 
East was seen as essential if the UK was to remain a world power. Without formal 
colonial possessions, HMG’s ability to meet its ‘world-wide commitments’ was 
‘dependent on facilities provided by others.’74 The Simonstown base was a prime 
example of such facilities located at ‘one of the strategic points on the globe, the 
Cape of Good Hope’.75 Its position between the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans 
made it important for maritime purposes, both commercial and military.  
The overflying and staging rights that South Africa provided the RAF were also seen 
as important for the UK’s broader interests. As Middle East and North African 
countries gained their independence or re-asserted themselves away from Britain’s 
informal sphere of influence, the RAF lost important staging and base rights in these 
territories.76 This led to what RAF Air Chief David Lee referred to as an ‘air barrier’ 
between northern and southern parts of the Middle East.’77 Although the ‘barrier’ 
could be circumvented, it made communication and reinforcement between the two 
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Middle East Command areas (Cyprus and Aden) extremely difficult.78 As more 
countries gained formal independence or sought to demonstrate their autonomy from 
former colonial powers, this ‘air barrier’ looked set to extend southwards through 
Africa.79 Overflying and staging rights provided by South Africa grew in importance 
as they offered strategic air routes to the Middle and Far East. Young argues that the 
Wilson government viewed these rights as more important than maritime access as 
they were vital to Britain’s ‘wider strategic concerns’ and the ‘wellbeing’ of the three 
High Commission Territories; Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland, British 
Crown Colonies that bordered on South Africa (or in the case of Basutoland were 
entirely surrounded by the republic) that did not gain their independence until 1966.80 
Indeed, the necessity of military intervention in Basutoland was viewed as a distinct 
possibility in the run up to colony’s 1965 elections.81  
Overflying and staging rights provided by South Africa also allowed for quicker 
transport to Mauritius, for whom Britain maintained external and internal defence 
commitments until 1974, and the Seychelles, which did not gain their independence 
until 1975.82 The Agreement also provided the UK with important communications 
facilities, without which there would be a ‘large gap’ in the Atlantic’s equatorial zone 
for both merchant shipping and warships.83 The Cape route was also viewed as 
strategically important for Western Europe; for example, in 1970, 27% of its overall 
trade and 34% of its oil arrived via these seaways.84  
As Cold War tensions escalated in the early 1960s, it looked likely that they would 
increasingly influence events in sub-Saharan Africa, much as they had done in East 
and Southeast Asia the previous decade. On 11 July 1960, the mineral rich province 
of Katanga seceded from the Republic of the Congo (RoC) less than two weeks after 
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it gained its independence from Belgium. Katangese leader Moïse Tshombe cited 
Patrice Lumumba and his central government’s alleged Communist leanings as 
justification. The ‘Congo Crisis’ which emerged from this went on for over five years 
and was the first instance of Cold War superpower rivalry in sub-Saharan Africa.85 
British policymakers were concerned about communist penetration, as the RoC 
bordered Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika, both of which remained British 
colonies at the time.86  
These tensions looked set to spread further through sub-Saharan Africa after 
Khrushchev’s promise in a speech at the UN on 6 January 1961 that the USSR 
would offer support to all ‘wars of national liberation’.87 From the beginning of the 
nationalist uprising against Portuguese rule in Angola in 1961, the USSR supported 
left-wing nationalist group the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA), providing it with ‘considerable 
material and financial assistance.’88 The USSR also supported nationalist 
movements elsewhere in Portugal’s African colonies.89 Glyn Stone argues that 
Western governments, including Britain’s, were alert to the increasing – but often 
conflicting and opposed – Soviet and Chinese activity in Africa during this period. 
Following an extensive review of Sino-Soviet penetration, the FO concluded in late 
December 1964 that communist activity in Africa 'is significant and increasing' and 
that, if communist influence was to be kept within reasonable bounds, the West 'must 
continue to take positive counter-measures’.90 
Initially, in this new Cold War context, MoD officials believed that relations with the 
white minority regimes of southern Africa offered more ‘tangible and reasonably cast-
iron military benefits.’91 The main opposition to the Apartheid regime derived from the 
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ANC, who were allied to the Soviet-backed SACP. However, continued UK-SA 
military cooperation was threatened when the Labour Party came to power in 
October 1964. Labour had been antagonistic towards South Africa whilst in 
opposition and their manifesto had pledged to end the supply of arms to Pretoria in 
accordance with the UN voluntary arms embargo. This was not implemented until 13 
March 1965, with leading figures, including Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend, 
warning that it would lead to the Agreement’s breakdown, an eventuality he saw as 
imperilling RN activity and merchant shipping in the South Atlantic.92 Despite the 
implementation of the embargo, the CICSASA would remain at Simonstown, bilateral 
training would continue for at least a year, and the exchange of officers would be 
unaffected by the arms embargo.93 
Despite attempts to cut ties with South Africa there was widespread support within 
the Labour government for Britain’s global military role. Wilson stated in December 
1964 that, ‘we cannot afford to relinquish our world role ... which for shorthand 
purposes, is sometimes called our “east of Suez” role’.94 Britain’s presence in the 
Indian Ocean was viewed as particularly important and the Wilson Government also 
maintained a significant military presence in Southeast Asia during the ‘undeclared 
war’ to defend Malaysia from ‘Indonesian aggrandizement’.95  
These broader interests clearly acted to limit the Labour administration attempts to 
ostracise Pretoria and naval cooperation continued unabated. In June 1967 – 
despite the Agreement’s recent renegotiation, which gave South Africa greater 
responsibility over the running of the Simonstown base – three RN ships made a 
five-day visit to Cape Town. However, Pretoria made it clear that race-based 
apartheid regulations would apply to all crew members on shore leave.  There was 
22 
 
fierce British domestic criticism of the visit and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) 
urged HMG to cancel the tour.96 Several Labour MPs pleaded with Wilson to 
intervene and stop the visit. David Winnick, Labour MP for Croydon South, 
successfully forced a debate on the issue in parliament on 31 May.97  This proved to 
be a heated affair with several MPs calling for Gerry Reynolds, the Minister of 
Defence (administration), to resign.98 Reynolds was unmoved by such protests and 
reiterated his and HMG’s position was that the exercises were in accordance with 
the Agreement and that measures had been put in place to ensure that those 
classified as ‘coloured’ under the racist system of apartheid could opt for a transfer to 
another ship.99  Despite the controversy that surrounded the visit, Defence Secretary 
Healey contended in August 1967 that, owing to its apparent success, naval 
cooperation with South Africa should be increased.100 He argued that this was 
especially important in light of the Suez Canal’s closure in the aftermath of the Six-
Day War between Egypt and Israel. The closure would lead to an increase in the 
number of British ships using the Cape route to the Far East.101  
Despite the desire on the part of some policymakers for Britain to retain a global 
military role, the £800 million balance of payments deficit inherited from the previous 
Conservative administration placed a major strain on the UK economy and meant 
that austerity measures were necessary to avoid devaluing the pound. Wilson had 
set a spending cap of £2000 million on defence by 1969 in 1964 prices.102 However, 
it became apparent that this target was too ambitious without a major re-evaluation 
of Britain’s global military role. The February 1966 Defence Review attempted to 
make such changes to Britain’s priorities by cancelling a number of capital projects 
and announcing a withdrawal from Aden by 1967.103 This did not go far enough; in 
July 1967 the Supplementary Statement on Defence announced a phased 
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withdrawal from the Malaysian and Singapore bases by the mid-1970s.104 Despite 
these and other cost cutting exercises, the Labour Government was forced to 
announce the fourteen percent devaluation of the pound on 18 November 1967.105 
The January 1968 statement on public expenditure brought forward the withdrawal 
from Southeast Asia to 1971 and signalled the end of Britain’s role as a global 
military power.106 From this point onwards Britain’s military presence overseas was 
focused on the defence of Europe.107  
The east of Suez withdrawal adds further complications to an assessment of the 
continuation of UK-SA military relations. If strategic considerations were the main 
factor in continuing military relations with the republic, then one might expect that the 
final withdrawal of the UK’s forces from east of Suez, completed in 1971, would have 
signalled a breaking of such ties and the Agreement’s cancellation. A report 
commissioned by the MoD in 1970 assessing the value of the facilities provided 
under the Agreement predicted that ‘after 1971 naval usage of South African 
facilities will be reduced to the regular transit of frigates to and from Hong Kong and 
irregular deployments of ships or small task forces to the Far East for training’.108  
Despite the now limited importance of Simonstown to HMG’s broader strategic 
interests, UK-SA relations improved in the military sphere as the Conservative 
government, that came to power in June 1970, lifted the arms embargo to allow for 
the sale of defensive maritime equipment to the republic.  
Lifting the embargo was justified by the build-up of the Soviet Fleet in the Indian 
Ocean, which made its first incursion into the area in March 1968 making ‘goodwill 
visits’ to India, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia, and South Yemen.109 Pretoria attempted to 
use this to its advantage, tirelessly emphasising the Cape Route’s importance to 
Western security.110 Officials within the MoD and the FCO Defence Department 
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viewed the Soviet threat in the area as credible. The main concern was the Soviet 
Navy’s ability to harass Western merchant shipping if a strong deterrent was not 
maintained.111 In August 1970, an MoD report argued that the facilities provided by 
the Agreement were of considerable importance in the defence of the Cape Route 
but also that the SAN could play a role in maintaining a credible deterrent and ease 
the burden on the RN.112 Rear Admiral Peter Austin, Assistant Chief of the Naval 
Staff Operations and Air, went as far as to argue that the RN’s views ‘corresponded 
closely with those expressed by the South Africans.’113 
The FCO Planning Staff’s Charles D Powell, however, claimed the MoD exaggerated 
the Soviet threat and the South African facilities’ importance to ‘prevent ministers 
reaching a decision to do away with the Simonstown Agreement.’114 Powell 
questioned the possibility of the USSR exercising an effective blockade of shipping 
in seas which stretched a thousand miles to the south.115 Robert M Tesh, Head of 
the FCO Defence Department and former Deputy High Commissioner in both Ghana 
and Zambia was a vocal advocate for maintaining military cooperation with Pretoria. 
However, in these circumstances he admitted that the Simonstown base had lost 
much of its importance and ‘could in a military sense be dispensed with’ as ‘the 
modern Navy is maintained largely by afloat support’.116 
There were several studies undertaken by the FCO and MoD in the 1960s and 70s 
to ascertain the Agreement’s importance. The general conclusion of these reports’ 
authors was that the facilities provided by the Agreement were ‘highly desirable but 
not essential’ for British overseas commitments.117 One report commissioned by the 
MoD in March 1970 contended that the main benefit offered by the facilities was that 
they ‘reduced the penalties in terms of longer periods at sea.’118 These included 
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tanker support, the collection of mail, and fresh provisions and stores. The layovers 
were also seen as important for crew morale as they provided ‘a valuable rest and 
recuperation facility’ for the ships company when on longer voyages. While this was 
clearly useful, it was hardly of vital strategic significance as some officials in the MoD 
claimed; the maintenance of UK-SA cooperation in this sphere had more to do with a 
desire on the part of these officials to protect British military influence over South 
Africa’s armed forces and the continuation of historic ties between the RN and SAN.  
The second Wilson government, elected in February 1974, re-introduced the arms 
embargo, although it was agreed that ‘operationally necessary ship visits’ would 
continue.119 In October, there were claims in the British media that a recent visit by 
the RN to South Africa could still be viewed as having a ‘goodwill’ element.120 
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan vigorously denied this, claiming that the South 
African government had ‘misrepresented’ the visit and seized the opportunity for 
propaganda purposes.121 This incident was the final straw for the Labour government 
and in a cabinet meeting on 31 October it was agreed that ‘although the defence 
facilities available to use under the Simonstown Agreement were useful in peacetime 
and could be of importance in war, their value was not such to justify continuance of 
the Agreement in view of its political objections.’122 
Formal termination occurred on 30 June 1975, although some officials wished to 
maintain some form of association with the South African armed forces. Most notable 
was the question of whether or not London should continue to offer training 
assistance to South African naval personnel, which caused extensive 
interdepartmental debates amongst officials. David West, at the MoD, argued that 
South African service personnel should be allowed on the majority of courses and 
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that this could allow London to continue to benefit from South African goodwill in 
regards to future use of their port facilities.123 The MoD’s view was supported by the 
‘men on the spot’ in Pretoria, Ambassador James Bottomley, who warned that South 
Africa would see the refusal of places on courses as completely unreasonable.124 
British Counsellor John Snodgrass believed that, if no places were offered, it would 
be a ‘breach of faith’ by HMG and could leave the UK open to retaliation by the 
South African government such as the refusal to maintain RN fuel stocks at 
Simonstown and Cape Town.125  
These debates took place within the context of southern Africa becoming an 
important Cold War battleground as the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique 
and Angola gained their independence on 25 June and 11 November respectively. 
The later quickly descended into a bloody civil war that went on until 2002 in which 
the USA, Soviet Union, Cuba, China, and South Africa were all involved as external 
supporters of the various fighting factions.126 Mozambique had a similar fate with civil 
war breaking out in 1977 between the Marxist government and RENAMO, an anti-
communist rebel group backed by Salisbury and Pretoria. While this would surely 
have influenced British policymakers, these events ran parallel to an increase in 
state violence and repression in South Africa and calls from the international 
community to ostracise the racist regime after police murdered over 600 children in 
the Soweto Township who were protesting against changes to the school curriculum. 
By December 1976, despite the potential threat to Britain’s broader interests in the 
republic, the FCO decided that South African armed forces personnel would no 
longer be allowed on training courses in the UK.127 The role of Senior British Naval 
Officer South Africa (which had been created after the CICSASA was withdrawn in 
January 1967) would be disbanded, however a RN representative would remain in 
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South Africa as a defence attaché.128 Officials also agreed that the informal 
exchange of intelligence would continue with Pretoria as this was in ‘Western 
interests’.129 While South Africa was no longer viewed as important enough to 
maintain the Agreement in the face of criticism from the international community, 
successive British governments still viewed cordial relations as important for national 
interests.  
Strategic considerations were clearly a factor in the continuation of UK-SA relations 
in the period 1960-75. However, South Africa’s strategic importance was often 
exaggerated by certain sections of the MoD and FCO Defence Department. Critics of 
UK-SA military cooperation argued that Britain could survive without these defence 
links and pointed to the US who managed to maintain a global presence without any 
facilities on the Cape.130 By 1970, even those who wished to maintain relations in 
this sphere, such as RM Tesh, admitted that they were no longer vital to the UK’s 
military interests. While there was a resurgence in military cooperation under Heath’s 
administration, owing to the perceived threat of Soviet Naval expansion into the 
Indian Ocean, there were interdepartmental disagreements over this justification. As 
the FCO Planning Staff’s Charles D Powell contended, there was little chance of the 
Soviet Navy establishing an effective blockade to Western shipping over thousands 
of miles of water.131 While the Soviets did attempt to infiltrate this region, this was 
little more than ‘flag-showing diplomatic visits’ designed to establish ‘Soviet political 
influence in the Indian ocean area.’132  
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Commonwealth Relations and the Rhodesia Crisis  
While the broader strategic issues alone may not adequately explain the continuation 
of UK-SA relations, there were other considerations related to the Soviet Expansion 
in the Indian Ocean. In a brief prepared by the MoD for the Prime Minister in 
advance of a meeting with the Kenyan Foreign Minister Dr Mungai, it was claimed 
that this was part of a broader Soviet plan to become ‘a world power to rival the 
United States.’133  The brief contended that this was likely opportunistic and 
designed to ‘strengthen their political hand in the area’ but also pointed to potential 
Soviet fear of Chinese expansion into Indian Ocean territories. Since 1964, British 
policy had been to take action to limit Sino-Soviet penetration of Africa and 
cooperation with the white minority regimes was part of this strategy.134 However, 
this led to criticism from the UN and the Commonwealth. David French argues that, 
from the late 1950s onwards, world opinion was an 'absolute principle' dictating how 
HMG conducted its foreign policy.135 This became even more important as Britain’s 
global power diminished; for example, in 1966 an MoD report stated that 'world 
opinion is quick to react to any incident and must be a major factor in determining 
our own reaction.'136  Western governments realised that in this Cold War context 
they needed to revaluate policy towards issues that African leaders viewed as 
internationally important.137 The biggest concern these leaders had was 'the issue of 
white minority rule in southern Africa.’138  
This was taken into consideration by British policymakers, particularly under Wilson’s 
two administrations, both of which implemented the UN voluntary arms embargo. 
Despite the promise that joint naval exercises would continue after the 
implementation of the embargo in 1965, it was decided by Foreign Secretary Michael 
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Stewart that Britain should not take part in that year’s ‘CAPEX’ exercise.139 These 
exercises focused on the defence of South Atlantic sea routes by Western powers, 
such as the US, France and Portugal, as well as South Africa, and had occurred 
annually since 1950. However, in 1965 only South Africa and Portugal were set to 
take part and it was decided that UK participation was an impossibility.140  
In the same year, Britain’s relations with Rhodesia reached crisis point as Ian Smith 
announced the UDI on 11 November 1965. The Rhodesia crisis was a cause of 
great embarrassment for Britain, with the Commonwealth and UN demanding 
tougher action against the white minority government. French argues that an 
invasion of Rhodesia by Britain would have had international approval.141 However, 
Sue Onslow argues that this was not something HMG was ever willing to consider as 
it was ‘morally and indeed politically undesirable’.142 As Rhodesia was landlocked 
and its neighbours with sea borders, South Africa, South West Africa and the 
Portuguese colony of Mozambique, were all sympathetic to the white settler regime, 
the prospect of an invasion was ‘logistically fraught with difficulty’.143 Phillip Murphy 
contends that owing to the continued close contacts between Britain and Rhodesia’s 
militaries, ‘there were concerns that the British armed forces would refuse to obey 
any order to fight against their Rhodesian ‘Kith and Kin’’.144 
However, despite Britain’s refusal to respond militarily to the UDI, the increasingly 
tense international climate in 1964– 65 made military intervention by the UN or the 
Organisation of African Unity a serious possibility.145 This would most likely have led 
to counter-intervention by South Africa, which Onslow describes as ‘the very stuff of 
nightmare for politicians in Westminster.’146 To reduce this threat Wilson attempted 
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to moderate black African demands while refusing to intervene militarily which he 
hoped would ‘soothe South African sensibilities’.147  
Solving the Rhodesia crisis is known to have become an obsession for Wilson. 
Richard Crossman, a leading figure in Wilson’s  first administration, claimed he 
referred to it as ‘his Cuba’.148 Pretoria, as regional hegemon, and Salisbury’s closest 
ally, was viewed as playing a vital part in the negotiations over Rhodesia’s future. 
Wilson felt he could press Verwoerd to exercise influence behind the scenes to bring 
both sides in the conflict together.149  Richard Coggins claims that ‘South Africa’s 
influence was probably crucial’ in starting the ‘talks about talks’ which brought the 
two sides together for the first time.150 Barber contends that despite an element of 
distrust, Britain and South Africa looked to each other to help broker a Rhodesian 
settlement.151 
Pretoria endeavoured to use this situation to its advantage. Barber and Barratt argue 
that South Africa’s attempt to purchase an arms ‘shopping list’ from Britain in 1967 
was incentivised with ‘the prospect of support in seeking a Rhodesian settlement.’152 
While the order was refused, Bale contends that Wilson had been interested in the 
prospect of a deal if it encompassed Rhodesia.153 In advance of talks to re-negotiate 
the Agreement in January 1967, a document was prepared by the FO and MoD 
which set out Britain’s objectives. In addition to a desire to maintain use of 
Simonstown in a time of war in which South Africa was not involved, and the hope of 
securing a large purchase order of naval equipment, the other key objective set out 
by HMG was to avoid ‘damaging our general relations with the South African 
government’ as ‘their attitude over Rhodesia in recent months has not been 
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unhelpful and is a vital factor in the success of our policy of bringing about the 
resumption of constitutional government there.’154  
While the Labour Government was reluctant to make serious strides to ostracise 
Pretoria militarily, the US, under the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
B. Johnson, went further in isolating the apartheid regime in this sphere. In the 1940s 
and 50s, the US had based its relations with South Africa primarily in a Cold War 
context, turning a blind eye to Pretoria’s overt racism and frequent human rights 
abuses. Thomas Borstelmann argues that ‘the sense of international emergency that 
pervaded the early Cold War years would help hide the substantial differences 
between the two countries behind a solid, if not iron, curtain of anticommunism.’155 
However, Kennedy risked US strategic interests in the republic, primarily its missile 
tracking stations based there, by implementing the voluntary arms embargo in 
1964.156 Kennedy was more sympathetic to the demands of African leaders than his 
predecessors and believed that more radical states such as Ghana, Guinea and 
perhaps even Mali could be persuaded to ‘turn to the West’.157 His tougher stance 
against a racialist regime was also linked to his domestic and foreign policy priorities, 
as in the same year he announced plans for the Civil Rights Act 1964. Such moves 
towards civil rights legislation were at least in part driven by concern for the corrosive 
effect racism in the US was having on relations with the decolonising world.158  
However, Richard Nixon’s administration was ‘convinced of the need for a strong, 
Western-orientated power to play the role of policeman in the region’ and entered 
into a closer relationship with the republic shortly after taking office in 1969.159 
Similarly, when the Conservative Party returned to power in Britain in 1970, the arms 
embargo was rescinded and the sale of weapons for maritime defence purposes 
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recommenced. Arthur Snelling, UK Ambassador to South Africa, emphasised the 
potential importance of the republic in any future East-West conflict, but advised 
against any formal alliance as this would ‘augment the danger we face by forcing the 
rest of Africa (or at any rate the ex-British parts of it) further into the company of the 
East.’160 This position was supported by Malcolm MacDonald, an FCO official and 
former governor general of Kenya, who explained that ‘undoubtedly some sale of 
arms to South Africa would help to protect those interests against the Russian 
presence in the Indian Ocean; but without any doubt the gain for our interest would 
be far more offset by the much greater consequent damage done to them – to the 
Russians’ advantage – elsewhere.’161  
Despite highlighting the perceived Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean, the 
authors of the MoD and FCO report on the potential impact of a resumption of arms 
sales on British relations with ‘Black Africa’ were apprehensive about a renewal in 
sales, claiming British interests were likely to suffer substantial damage without 
countervailing gains in South Africa.162  While it was argued that the defence facilities 
in Mombasa, Karachi and Bombay were of limited use in the Indian Ocean’s defence 
without access to South African facilities, there were fears that resuming arms sales 
may see these ports fall under Soviet influence as their leaders lashed out against 
the UK in a showing of Afro-Asian solidarity. John Graham, Principal Private 
Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, summarised this position stating that the sales of 
arms would ‘result in a polarisation of view in Africa generally, with the Russians on 
the side of the angels and ourselves the French and the Portuguese on the other.’163 
The joint MoD and FCO report also argued that South Africa had similar defence 
interests to Britain and was ‘unlikely to willingly increase her political isolation’ 
meaning ‘the continuation of her defence agreements with us is unlikely to be at risk’, 
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even if arms sales were not resumed.164 The authors also believed that South Africa 
would still maintain a strong military as other countries, such as France, would 
supply arms to Pretoria. The report’s writers concluded that ‘on balance it would be 
less harmful to put at risk South African cooperation, if only in peacetime, than that of 
Black African and other Indian Ocean countries; but the clear defence interest is to 
maintain both.’165  
Tesh criticised the report for overemphasising the importance of British interests in 
‘Black Africa’.166 He also claimed HMG could not assume UK-SA cooperation would 
continue without the resumption of arms sales. Tesh also dismissed the claim that 
South Africa would continue to be well-armed as African states would no doubt put 
similar pressure on other suppliers and downplayed the potential threat to 
Commonwealth relations, arguing that the organisation’s members ‘even Black 
African ones, are frequently shrewder than we expect them to be.’167 Tesh pointed to 
the muted reaction of African Commonwealth members to Rhodesia’s UDI in 
November 1965, with only Ghana and Tanzania breaking off relations over what was 
‘surely a bigger shock than the sales of arms from us to South Africa’.168 
Heath’s government pressed ahead with a resumption in arms sales and, when 
challenged by African Commonwealth leaders, remained committed to sales and to 
the Agreement. In October 1970, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere met with 
Heath at Chequers to discuss the matter. The British prime minister emphasised the 
Cape Route’s importance and the potential threat posed by the USSR. Heath stated 
that he ‘had grown up during the years of the Berlin-Rome axis. He was not now 
prepared to remain passive in the face of a similar threat from the Soviet Union.’169 
Nyerere responded by emphasising that Tanzania, and much of the African 
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continent, did not view relations with South Africa in the context of defence as for 
them ‘the dominant consideration was apartheid.’170 Nyerere also pointed to the 
radical shift in the international context since the Agreement was signed in 1955, 
explaining that there were very few independent African countries at the time and 
that ‘new situations demanded new attitudes of mind, and perhaps Britain should 
even take a fresh look at the Simonstown Agreement itself.’171  
Other African leaders were unconvinced by the Cold War defensive arguments put 
forward by HMG. Cameroon’s Foreign Secretary, Aimé-Raymond N’Thepe, for 
example, contended that if this was so vitally important to Western interests, then 
other Western European powers and the US would be involved in their defence.172 
The Defence Secretary Lord Peter Carington, however, argued that ‘the United 
States does not have the same degree of dependence as the United Kingdom in the 
free flow of trade along routes which pass the Cape of Good Hope’.173 The 
consensus amongst leading ministers was that continued UK- South Africa armed 
forces cooperation was, to some extent, worth the risk of alienating Afro-Asian 
Commonwealth members. Carington felt that South Africa was a more reliable 
partner in the region as it would ‘never join the Soviet Camp’.174  Arms sales to South 
Africa were a contentious issue at the 1971 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting in Singapore. The acrimony expressed towards the British government over 
possible arms sales to Pretoria and the continued use of the Simonstown naval base 
led the FCO to conclude that the entire affair ‘came fairly close to wrecking the 
Commonwealth.’175  
Even after the Agreement’s cancellation in 1975, Cold War considerations still 
played a role in military relations with the republic. In 1978, in the context of financial 
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uncertainty and economic woe faced by James Callaghan’s Labour government, it 
was decided that Britain’s diplomatic presence overseas would be reduced by 
twenty-five per cent. Foreign Secretary Dr David Owen argued that South Africa 
should be no exception to these diplomatic cutbacks.176 However, Defence Secretary 
Fred Mulley argued that the two military attachés in Pretoria were an invaluable 
source of intelligence stemming from their contacts in South African military 
circles.177 The British diplomatic position in South Africa was also regional, as 
London did not have defence attachés anywhere else in southern Africa, which was 
still a volatile ‘Cold War theatre’.  
It is clear that Cold War considerations played a role in maintaining military 
cooperation, particularly when the Conservative Party was in power. However, at the 
same time, fear of alienating other African states and driving them into the USSR or 
PRC’s embrace meant that this policy had to be handled carefully. Even the Heath 
government’s decision to lift the arms ban was focussed specifically on the sale of 
maritime weapons and Pretoria was disappointed by this decision, hoping the ban’s 
lifting would offer access to a wider range of weaponry.178 This decision reflected the 
tightrope HMG officials had to walk, balancing Cold War defence considerations with 
the battle to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the decolonising, often non-aligned, 
world.   
Conclusion  
Continued cooperation between Britain and South Africa’s armed forces from 1961 
to 1975 was influenced by a wide range of factors. Economic considerations were 
clearly important, and some members of Wilson’s first government were prepared to 
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put the British economy before their principles when Pretoria approached London 
with the arms ‘shopping list’. However, economic interests alone do not adequately 
explain the persistence of UK-SA military cooperation, and were considered of 
secondary importance to strategic considerations when the Heath administration 
allowed the sale of weapons for maritime defence to recommence in 1970.  
Britain’s broader strategic interests were an important consideration in the 
continuation of UK-SA military relations. The Simonstown Naval Base was 
strategically significant owing to its position between the South Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans, and South Africa provided the UK with important overflying and staging 
rights. The Cape Route grew in importance as a result of the Suez Canal’s closure in 
1967, and the rise in the use of supertankers which were unable to travel through the 
canal even if it was open. However, the Agreement was maintained after the east of 
Suez withdrawal was completed in 1971 and Britain’s decolonisation process was all 
but complete. The continuation of military cooperation was based on broader 
considerations than purely as an important connection en route to the Far East and 
Persian Gulf. 
Cold War considerations in sub-Saharan Africa offer another possible explanation for 
the durability of military cooperation. While the 1968 Duncan Report played down the 
overall importance of Africa in Britain’s overseas interests, it did emphasise the 
importance of maintaining influence on the continent to counter Soviet and Chinese 
expansion.179 This was compounded by the Soviet Navy’s incursions into the Indian 
Ocean in the same year. Despite this, while a strong white South Africa would offer a 
valuable partner, there were fears that if relations were maintained with the apartheid 
state other African countries could align with one of the major communist states. This 
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was clearly more important to Labour when in power, as they cancelled British 
involvement in the CAPEX exercise from 1965 fearing the potential backlash against 
joint naval exercise alongside South Africa and Portugal. Even after the Agreement’s 
cancellation in 1975, British military attachés remained in the republic until 1985 as 
they were considered to be a good source of intelligence on the Cold War proxy 
conflicts in Angola and Mozambique.180  
There was never one overriding motivation for British policy makers to continue 
armed forces collaboration with South Africa from 1961 to 1975. Instead, a complex 
constellation of factors saw cooperation continue until 1975, and, in some limited 
areas, beyond. Clearly, rather than retreating from sub-Saharan Africa in the post-
imperial age, British officials still viewed the region as a key foreign policy arena, at 
least until the completion of the east of Suez withdrawal. A wind of change did 
indeed sweep through Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, but it took some time for it to 
really blow through the UK-South African military relationship. 
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